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How much
will I be paying in CHILD
SUPPORT? Child Support will vary on different factors such as
income of the parties, whether child is in daycare, whether health insurance is
available, amount of time spent with child, number of children, whether older
children from another relationship are still minors, etc. Use the following
child support calculator to get a general idea of what your child support may
be; however, you should consult with our office in order to get a more accurate
amount as the following calculator does not reflect recent changes to the
guidelines>.

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complete index of all FLORIDA
STATUTES, click on the following link:

The Florida
Supreme Court has authorized and approved the FREE
FORMS found in the following link for Family Law cases.

RECENT
CASES DECIDED BY FLORIDA COURTS

ARBITRATION
Volume 35, Number 42, Martinez v. Martinez
Cases involving issues of child custody, visitation, or child support are
excluded from Arbitration. See Fla. Stat 44.104 and Toiberman v. Tiseru, 998 So.
2d 4 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008).
The Toiberman decision held that: the term dispute in section 44.104(1) and
(14), Florida Statutes (2006), was intended by the legislature to reference the
complete action between the parties, as opposed to the issues involved in the
dispute. Thus, by specifying that section 44.104 shall not apply to any
dispute involving child custody, visitation, or child support, the
legislature intended to exclude from arbitration all lawsuits that involve
issues of child custody, visitation, or child support.
The underlying logic of Toiberman is that is that a decision on the
financial issues in a matrimonial case can affect the ability of one or both
parties to comply with the provisions governing child custody, visitation or
(where applicable) child support.

ALIMONY
Volume 35, Number 44, Wallace v. Wallace
Walker v. Walker, 818 So. 2d 711, 713 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)(holding that the
trial courts failure to make adequate factual findings to explain or support its
decision regarding the type and amount of alimony requires reversal for such
findings).
Betancourt v. Betancourt, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D29 (2^nd DCA
2010)
The essential criterion for fixing an amount of alimony is after a payees
need a present ability of the payor to sustain it. Jaffy v. Jaffy, 965
So2d 825, 829 (Fla. 4^th DCA 2007).
Janssens v. Jansenns, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D59 (5^th DCA 2011)
It has long been established that need and ability to pay are the primary
elements to be considered by a court in determining permanent periodic alimony.
Id. See also Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980).
Parties pre-existing debt does not take priority over Wifes current need of
alimony.
Schang v. Schang, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D279 (1^st DCA 2011)
Alimony based on change of circumstances, trial court must consider 61.08(2)
factors. Wolfe v. Wolfe, 953 So.2d 632, 636 9Fla. 4^th DCA 2007); see
Overton v. Overton, 34 So. 3d 759, 761 (Fla. 1^st DCA 2010).
[T]he primary criteria at issue under such circumstances are the payee
spouses needs with regard to the standard of living established during the
marriage and the payor spouses ability to pay. Zeballos v. Zeballos, 951 So. 2d
972, 974 (Fla. 4^th DCA 2007).
When awarding alimony, a court is to consider not only income, but also the
extent and value of the parties capital assets. See Howard v. Howard, 118 So. 2d
90, 94 (Fla. 1^st DCA 1960).
APPEALS
Williamson v. Cowan, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D19 (5^th DCA 2010)
Must challenge adequacy of findings via a motion for rehearing in order to
preserve same for appellate review. See Mathieu v. Mathieu, 877 So. 2d 740, 741
(Fla. 5^th DCA 2004).
ATTORNEY FEES

Sullivan v. Sullivan, 35 Fla. L. Weekly D2896 (4^th DCA 2010)
Section 57.105 does not require a party seeking fees to show the complete
absence of a justiciable issue of fact or law, but permits fees to be recovered
for any claim or defense that is insufficiently supported. Gopman v. Department
of Education, 974 So.2d 1208, 1210 (Fla. 1^st DCA 2008); see also
Wendys of N.E. Fla. v. Vandergriff, 865 So2d 520, 523 (Fla. 1^st DCA
2003).
The determination of factual or legal merit can occur either when the claim
or defense is first made, or later when the party discovers, or should have
discovered, that the claim or defense lacks factual or legal merit. See Gopman
v. Department of Education, 974 So.2d 1208, 1210 (Fla. 1^st DCA
2008).
Kurgan v. Weiner, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D3 (3^rd DCA 2011)
Imposition of attorney fees under 57.105 requires statutory findings to
support award. See Valdes v. Lovaas, 784 So.2d 474 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)
Siboni v. Allen (36 Fla. L. Weekly D11 (5^th DCA 2011)
Rule 1.525 provides: A party seeking a judgment taxing costs, attorneys fees,
or both shall serve a motion no later than 30 days after filing of the judgment,
including a judgment of dismissal, or the service of a notice of voluntary
dismissal.
Higginbotham v. Higginbotham, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D73 (3^rd DCA
2011)
Wife was not limited to $5,000 cap on attorney fees per parties anteniuptial
agreement. See Belcher v. Belcher, 271 So.2d (Fla. 1972); Johnson v. Johnson,
946 So.2d 1132 (Fla. 1^st DCA 2006)
Court ruled temporary fees awarded excessive in light of fact that results
obtained were in favor of husband (Rosen) and husbands attorney charged
$138,442.00 v. $305,640.00 charged by wifes attorney.
Attorney fees should not be awarded for time and services in excess of those
required for the representation in question . . . . See Miller v. First American
Bank and Trust, 607 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 4^th DCA 1992).
[T]he purpose of [attorney fees] in domestic cases is to accord the
respective parties an approximately equal ability and opportunity to retain
counsel. See Cummings v. Cummings, 330 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 1976); Bullard v.
Bullard, 380 So.2d 1090 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
Glass v. Glass, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D42 (4^th DCA 2011)
Phillips v. Ford, 35 Fla. L. Weekly D2590 (Fla. 4^th DCA Nov. 24,
2010)(in awarding feespursuant to section 61.16, Florida Statutes, the trial
court must make factual findings concerning both need and ability to pay.)
Court here, in a contempt hearing, reversed an award of attorney fees because
order includes finding of ability to pay but not need.
Ingram v. Ingram, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D357 (Fla. 1^st DCA 2011)
Trial court must set forth specific findings regarding the hourly rate, the
number of hours reasonably expended, and the appropriateness of the reduction or
enhancement factors as mandated by the supreme court in Florida Patients
Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So.2d 1145 (Fla. 1985). Teat v. City of
Apalachicola, 880 So.2d 819, 820 (Fla. 1^st DCA 2004).
Blits v. Renaissance Cruises, Inc., 647 So.2d 971, 972 (Fla. 4^th
DCA1994)(trial courts oral pronouncement at an evidentiary hearing on attorneys
fees that it arrived at its $11,250 fees award by multiplying seventy-five hours
of work times $150 an hour rendered the courts failure to make the explicit
findings required by Rowe harmless); see also Teat, 880 So. 2d at 821 (Wolf, J.,
concurring)(discussing the application of the harmless error test in the context
of Rowe).
Morrison v. Morrison, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D321 (2^nd DCA 2011)

Attorney fee inquiries are premised on whether one spouse has a need for fees
and the other spouse has the ability to pay them Von Baillou v. Von Baillou, 959
So. 2d 821, 823 (4^th DCA 2007).
Financial need is defined as the necessity for some financial assistance to
engage an attorney and pay attorney fees. Id. (quoting Satter v. Satter, 709
So.2d 617, 619 (Fla. 4^th DCA 1998)).
Holub v. Holub, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D332 (1^st DCA 2011)
We find that all child support cases that are administered by the Department
of Revenue are considered Title IV-D cases, despite the fact that the Department
of Revenue has not been named a party to the case.
In Title IV-D cases, section 61.16 states that attorneys fees may only be
assessed against the non-prevailing obligor.
Powell v. Powell, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D449 (4^th DCA 2011)
Final judgment contained no findings regarding number of hours reasonably
expended and the appropriateness of reduction or enhancement factors.
The law is well established that the trial court must set forth specific
findings concerning the hourly rate, the number of hours reasonably expended and
the appropriateness of reduction or enhancement factors. See Fla. Patients Comp.
Fund v. Rowe, 472 So.2d 1145, 1151 (Fla. 1985); see also Macarty v. Macarty, 29
So.3d 434, 435 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010)([A]n award of attorneys fees without adequate
findings justifying the amount of the award is reversible even where the
appellant has provided an inadequate record of the trial court proceedings.
(quoting Esaw v. Esaw, 965 So. 2d 1261, 1265 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)).
BANKRUPTCY
Dischargeable Debts in Divorce- The Dissolution of Dischargeability,
Christopher A. Tiso, The Florida Bar Journal/March 2011
Support related obligations, alimony, maintenance, child support emanating
from msa, separation agreement or judgment are not dischargeable under 523(a)(5)
of the Bankruptcy code.
Law applies to all bankruptcy cases filed on or after October 17^th
2005.
523(a)(15), a debtor may not receive a discharge if the debt is to a spouse,
former spouse, or child of the debtor and not of the kind described in paragraph
(5) that is incurred by the debtor in the course of a divorce or separation or
in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree, or other order of a
court of record.
Some things may be dischargeable in Ch. 13 proceeding (not support
obligations) but maybe property settlements.
Always include hold harmless agreements nd indennification in msa. Creates
direct liability from debtor to former spouse. Although not necessary to a
finding of nondischargeability.
Nondischargeable pursuant to BAPCPA: property equalization and equitable
distribution payments, lump sum distribution and payments, credit card and
charge account obligations, mortgage and HELOC payments, homeowners association
dues, income tax obligations, automobile loan payments, indemnification and hold
harmless obligations, medical bills, attorneys fee obligations between the
spouses incurred in matters unrelated to the divorce, and sanctions awarded for
contemptuous conduct. (not exhaustive list)
Attorney fees awarded in divorce are clearly nondiscahrgeable, whether in
nature of support under 523(a)(5) or otherwise. Can be payable to former spouse
or directly to attorney. If not under 523(a)(5), can collect under
523(a)(15).
Post dissolution fee awards for enforcement purposes are nondischargeable.
Attorney owed fees from clients former spouse has standing to pursue claim for
nondischargeability in the bankruptcy proceeding.
Debtors liability for his own attorney fees are dischargeable unless the
court orders former spouse to pay any of those fees- that award would remain
undischarged.
Deficiency Judgment: get other party to agree to pay mortgage- that will
constitute a nondischargeable obligation. Always provide who is responsible for
mortgage and note as well as who should bear burden of deficiency judgment.
BIRTH CERTIFICATE
Nevitt v. Bonomo, 35 Fla. L. Weekly D2871 (1^st DCA 2010)
Fla. Stat 382.013(2)(a), If the mother is married at the time of birth, the
name of the husband shall be entered on the birth certificate as the father of
the child, unless paternity has been determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction.
CENTRAL GOVERNMENTAL DEPOSITORY
Volume 35, Number 40, Bishop v. Bishop
Final judgment has errors including ordering child support be paid directly
to wife contrary to section 61.13(1)(d)(3), Florida Statutes, which requires
payments to be made through the Central Governmental Depository absent a request
by both parties and a finding by the court that it is in the best interest of
the child.
CHARGING LIEN/RETAINING LIEN
LaVere-Alvaro v. Syprett, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D386 (2^nd DCA
2011)
The charging lien is an equitable right to have costs and fees due an
attorney for services in the suit secured to him in the judgment or recovery in
that particular suit. Sinclair, Louis, Siegel, Heath, Nussbaum & Zavertnik,
P.A. v. Baucom, 428 So.2d 1383, 1384 (Fla. 1983).
[i]t is not enough to support the imposition of a charging lien that an
attorney has provided his services; the services must, in addition, produce a
positive judgment or settlement for the client, since the lien will attach only
to the tangible fruits of the services. Mitchell v. Coleman, 868 So. 2d 639, 641
(Fla. 2d DCA 2004)(quoting Correa v. Christensen, 780 So.2d 220, 220 (Fla.
5^th DCA 2001)).
Retaining Lien can attach to property but party must have ownership
interest.
CHILD ABUSE
Doran v. Doran, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D44 (1^st DCA 2011)
Fla. Stat 61.13(m) allows relevant evidence of child abuse in determining
modification of timesharing.
Wife wanted to present the following which was erroneously denied by the
trial court:

CHILD SUPPORT
Volume 35, Number 42, Hill v. Calderin (3^rd DCA)
Florida Department of Revenue is authorized to file an action to recover
child support on behalf of a dependent childs custodian. Section 409.2561, Fla.
Stat. (2009); Lamm v. Chapman, 413 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 1982).
Rowe v. Borysek-Rodriguez, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D131 (2^nd DCA
2011)
Noncovered expenses if not factored into the child support guidelines
calculation . . . should be apportioned based on the parties relative incomes.
See Wilcox v. Munuz, 35 So. 3d 136, 141 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010); Martinez v.
Martinez, 911 So. 2d 288, 289-90 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005).
Reversed where court attributed half of childs unreimbursed medical expenses
t each party where one party earned more money.
Dept of Revenue v. Jackson, 846 So.2d 486, 498 (Fla. 2003)(holding that
equitable principles apply to child support proceedings).
Laussermair v. Laussermair, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D448 (4^th DCA
2011)
Provisions relieving the obligor from their duty to support [their] minor
child entirely or permanently, is against public policy. See Lester v. Lester,
736 So. 2d 1257, 1259 (Fla. 4^th DCA 1999)(quoting Brock v. Hudson,
494 So. 2d 285, 287 n.3 (Fla. 1^st DCA 1986)).
The obligation of a parent to not waive or otherwise contract away their
childs right to support . . . does not preclude [parents] from making contracts
or agreements concerning their childs support so long as the best interests of
the child are served. Lester, 736 So.2d at 1259 (internal citation omitted).
A provision requiring child support money to be paid into a college education
account is not against public policy. See Laussermair.
CHILD SUPPORT DEDUCTIONS/DEFENSES
61.30(3)(g) Spousal support paid pursuant to a court order from a previous
marriage or the marriage before the court, is an allowable deduction from gross
income when calculating child support.
CONTEMPT
Pirelli v. Bolanos, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D343 (4^th DCA 2011)
Martyak v. Martyyak, 873 So.2d 405, 407 (Fla. 4^th DCA
2004)(holding that to incarcerate an alleged contemnor for failing to pay court
ordered support, the trial court must make separate affirmative findings that
[the alleged contemnor] has the ability to pay the purge amount, and the basis
for such ability.
Court must specify basis for its finding that contemnor has ability to pay
purge.
See Braswell v. Braswell, 881 So.2d 1193, 1198 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004).
See Fla. Fam.L.R.P. 12.615(e).
CORPORATIONS
Sullivan v. Sullivan, 35 Fla. L. Weekly D2896 (4^th DCA 2010)
[E]quity will not allow a corporate veil to cover fraud or injustice, and to
prevent such the corporate entity may be disregarded and the corporation and
individual or individuals owning all of its stock and assets treated as
identical. Plank v. Arban, 241 So.2d 198, 200 (Fla. 4^th DCA
1970).
DISSIPATION OF ASSETS
Volume 35, Number 40, Bishop v. Bishop
As a general proposition, it is error to include assets in an equitable
distribution scheme that have been diminished or dissipated during the
dissolution proceedings . . . .[A]n exception to this general proposition exists
when misconduct during the dissolution proceedings results in the dissipation of
a marital asset. In that case, the misconduct may serve as a basis for assigning
the dissipated asset to the spending spouse when calculating equitable
distribution.
To include a dissipated asset in the equitable distribution scheme, You must
have evidence of the spending spouses intentional dissipation or destruction of
the asset, and the trial court must make specific finding that the dissipation
resulted from intentional misconduct. Roth v. Roth, 973 So.2d 580, 584-85 (Fla.
2d DCA 2008).
DISSIPATION OF ASSETS
Volume 35, Number 40, Bishop v. Bishop
As a general proposition, it is error to include assets in an equitable
distribution scheme that have been diminished or dissipated during the
dissolution proceedings . . . .[A]n exception to this general proposition exists
when misconduct during the dissolution proceedings results in the dissipation of
a marital asset. In that case, the misconduct may serve as a basis for assigning
the dissipated asset to the spending spouse when calculating equitable
distribution.
To include a dissipated asset in the equitable distribution scheme, You must
have evidence of the spending spouses intentional dissipation or destruction of
the asset, and the trial court must make specific finding that the dissipation
resulted from intentional misconduct. Roth v. Roth, 973 So.2d 580, 584-85 (Fla.
2d DCA 2008).
DISMISSAL
Kwong v. Countrywide, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D251 (4^th DCA 2011)
Process server failed tow rite time of service among other things.
Strict compliance with statutory requirements of service is mandated . . . .
Failure to make the obligatory notations renders the service defective. See
Vidal v. Suntrust Bank, 41 So.3d 401 (Fla. 4^th DCA 2010).
DNA TESTING
Dept of Revenue v. Lynch, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D285 (1^st DCA
2011)
[N]o party to amy family law proceeding is entitled to an order requiring
another party to submit to genetic testing unless (1) the proceedings place
paternity in controversy and (2) good cause exists for the testing. Dept of
Revenue v. Travis, 971 So.2d 157 (Fla. 1^st DCA 2007).
Good cause exists if proceedings instituted under 742.10(4), Florida Statues
(2009), or section 742.18(1), Florida Statutes (2009).
Dept of Revenue v. Ductant, 957 So.2d 658, 659-60 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007)(holding
that because a DNA test confirmed that the purported father was not the childs
father, the purported father sufficiently established that there had been a
material mistake of fact that was sufficient to disestablish paternity).
Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.491(e) states child support
enforcement officer does not have authority to hear contested paternity cases.
Dept of Revenue ex rel. Striggles v. Standifer, 990 So. 2d 659, 661(Fla.
1^st DCA 2008).
DUE PROCESS
DOR v. Bunnell, 35 Fla. L. Weekly D2878 (1^st DCA 2010)
The constitutional guarantee of due process, which extends into every
proceeding, requires th[at] the opportunity to be heard be full and fair, not
merely colorable or illusive. See Edelman v. Breed, 836 So.2d 1092, 1094 (Fla.
5^th DCA 2003)(quoting Pelle v. Diners Club, 287 So. 2d 737, 738 (Fla.
3d DCA 1974)).
Right to be heard has little reality or worth unless one is informed that the
matter is pending and can choose for himself whether to appear or default,
acquiesce or contest. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
In the case at bar, no notice of hearing regarding the particular issue, not
in petition, nor answer, etc.
EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION
Santiago v. Santiago, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D125 (2^nd DCA 2011)
While the initial premise behind an equitable distribution of marital assets
and liabilities is equal distribution, when proper justification is shown, a
trial court may make an unequal distribution. Rogers v Rogers, 12 So. 3d 288,
291 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)
Trial court is permitted to consider [partys] intentional waste or depletion
of marital assets and other factors to do equity and justice between the
parties. See 61.075(1)(i), (j), Fla. Stat. (2009); Jonsson v. Jonsson, 715 So.
2d 1064, 1064 (Fla. 5^th DCA 1998)([I]n determining equitable
distribution, alimony, and attorneys fees, the trial court may consider whether
one party intentionally dissipated the marital assets or adversely affected the
financial status of the other party.).
When a trial court makes an unequal distribution of assets, it must supply a
specific finding of fact to justify its unequal distribution. Guida v. Guida,
870 So.2d 222, 224 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).
Boutwell v. Adams, 920 So.2d 151, 154 (Fla. 1^st DCA 2006)(holding
that unequal distribution was abuse of discretion where trial court found
husband liable for postseparation debt and also factored that debt into
distribution scheme; it penalized the husband twice for his debts).
Lorman v. Loman, 633 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)(holding that before
trial court may impose tax liability solely on one party, it must first
determine the amount of the tax liability and then give appropriate
consideration to the financial consequences this liability will have on an
overall scheme of equitable distribution).
Dybalski v. Dybalski, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D159 (5^th DCA 2011)
[a]n equal division of marital assets is presumptively proper under section
61.075 and thus an unequal distribution must be justified by findings made by
the court. Porzio v. Porzio, 760 So. 2d 1075, 1077-78 (Fla. 5^th DCA
2000); Guobaitis v. Sherrer, 18 So. 3d 28, 31 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000).
Belford v. Belford, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D163 (2^nd DCA 2011)
In the absence of misconduct, it is error to charge to a partys share of
equitable distribution assets that were dissipated during the dissolution
proceedings. Roth v. Roth, 973 So. 2d 580, 584-85 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008).
[I]n the absence of misconduct, it is error to classify marital debt as one
partys nonmarital obligation. See Branch v. Branch, 775 So. 2d 406 (Fla.
1^st DCA 2000).
Misconduct is not shown by mismanagement or simple squandering of marital
assets in a manner of which the other spouse disapproves. Roth, 973 So.2d at
585. Must show funds used for one partys own benefit and for a purpose unrelated
to the marriage at a time when the marriage is undergoing an irreconcilable
break-down. Id. (quoting Romano v. Romano, 632 So. 2d 207, 210 (Fla.
4^th DCA 1994).
Randall v. Randall, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D210 (2^nd DCA 2011)
The general rule is that an engagement ring is nonmarital property. See
Malone v. Malone, 929 So. 2d 541, 541 (Fla. 1^st DCA 2006); Rosen v.
Rosen, 738 so. 2d 474, 475 (Fla. 4^th DCA 1999).
[i]t was error for the trial court to consider the wifes premarital property,
such as her engagement and wedding rings which were found to be gifts to the
wife, in the equitable distribution scheme. Melvik v. Melvik, 669 So. 2d 328,
330 (Fla. 4^th DCA 1996).
Volume 35, Number 40, Tillman v. Altunay
[t]he date for determining value of assets and the amount of liabilities
identified or classified as marital is the date or dates as the judge determines
is just and equitable under the circumstances. 61.075(7), Fla Stat. (2008); see
also Byers v. Byers, 910 So. 2d 336, 345 (Fla. 4^th DCA 2005)([T]he
date of valuation of marital assets in dissolution proceedings is to be
determined on the facts and circumstances thereof.
it is error to include in the equitable distribution scheme assets or sums
that have been diminished or depleted during the dissolution proceedings unless
depletion was the result of misconduct. Bush v. Bush, 824 So. 2d 293, 294 (Fla.
4^th DCA 2002)
As we stated in Byers: [T]here frequently may be substantial lapse of time
between the date of commencement of the action and the date of trial . . . .
Under such circumstances, the valuation of assets close to the time of trial may
result in the formulation of an award consistent with the purpose of equitable
distribution and insure that each spouse receives a fair share of the family
assets accumulated while the marital relationship endured. 910 So. 2d 345.
35 Fla. L. Weekly D2242
Rulings regarding equitable distribution are subject to an abuse of
discretion standard of review. Hollister v. Hollister, 965 So.2d 2d 341, 343-44
(Fla. 2d DCA 2007).
An award that is in the nature of deferred compensation and that is granted
during the marriage is usually a marital asset because it is compensation for
past marital labor. See Parry v. Parry, 933 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006).
35 Fla. L. Weekly D2193, Heysek v. Heyseck
IRA that is inherited is non-marital if has not been transferred or
commingled with marital funds.
Nonmarital assets include [a]ssets acquired separately by either party by
noninterspousal gift, bequest, devise, or descent, and assets acquired in
exchange for such assets. 61.075(b)(2), Fla. Stat. (2004); see Greico v. Greico,
917 So. 2d 1052, 1053-54 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)(noting same).
Noone v. Noone, 727 So.2d 972, 975 (Fla. 5^th DCA 1998), holding
that the husband could not be charged in equitable distribution both with the
use of marital funds to purchase a car and with the value of the car.
Volume 35, Number 44, Wallace v. Wallace
Pavese v. Pavese, 932 So.2d 1269, 1270 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)(citing section
61.075(3), Florida Statutes and holding that a final judgment of dissolution
that fails to include specific written findings of fact that identify, classify,
value, and distribute the parties assets and liabilities must be reversed)
Pignataro v. Rutledge, 841 So. 2d 636, 638 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)(holding that a
final judgment of dissolution must contain specific written findings valuing the
parties assets and liabilities and justifying any unequal distribution)
EQUALIZING PAYMENT
Volume 35, Number 40, Bishop v. Bishop
A lump sum equalizing payment to accomplish equitable distribution is
properly awarded only when the evidence reflects a justification for such an
award and the ability of the paying spouse to make the payment without
substantially endangering his or her economic status. Vigo v. Vigo, 15 So. 3d
619, 622 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009).
EXCEPTIONS
Wilson v. Smith, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D254 (Fla. 2^nd DCA 2011)
[I]t is error for the trial court t adopt a magistrates report in a family
law matter for the trial court to adopt a magistrates report in a family law
matter without first holding a hearing on any timely filed exceptions to that
report. See Simmons v. Simmons, 16 So.3d 878, 878 (Fla. 5tha DCA 2009).
EXCLUSIVE USE AND POSSESSION
Coristine v. Coristine, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D318 (5^th DCA 2011)
As a general rule, a trial court should award the primary residential parent
exclusive use and possession of the marital residence until the youngest child
reaches majority or is emancipated, or the primary residential parent remarries,
unless there are special circumstances. See Martin v. Martin, 959 So.2d 803, 805
(Fla. 1^st DCA 2007); Schumaker v. Schumaker, 931 So.2d 271, 276 (Fla.
5^th DCA 2006); Dehler v. Dehler, 648 So.2d 819, 820 (Fla.
4^th DCA 1995).
Special circumstances exist where the parties incomes are inadequate to meet
their debts, obligations, and normal living expenses, as well as the expenses of
maintaining the marital residence. See also Pineiro v. Pineiro, 683 So.2d 148,
149 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).
Volume 35, Number 42, Lefler v. Lefler (4^th DCA)
Although the wife did not include a specific request for the marital home in
her pleadings, the grant of exclusive use and possession of the marital home was
incident to child custody. See Dorsett v. Dorsett, 902 So.2 947, 953 (Fla.
4^th DCA 2005).
Wife had been awarded custody and child support.
FATHER
The Florida Bar Journal/April 2011
Generally, until there is an adjudication of paternity, the mother of a child
is deemed the natural guardian of a child born out of wedlock under F.S.
744.301(1)(2010).
[U]ntil the putative father asserts his rights for parental responsibility
and timesharing, he has no rights to the child in the eyes of the law.
[A] fathers name on a childs birth certificate creates voluntary
acknowledgement of paternity creating rebuttable presumption of paternity.
If father signs the Florida Department of Health form, this consenting
affidavit is used for the establishment of paternity in an administrative
context instead of judicial proceedings under F.S. 742.10(1).
A child born during an intact marriage, even if the husband is not the
biological father, is still deemed legitimate and born of the marriage, even if
the biological father is later adjudicated the father and ordered to pay
support.
FINAL JUDGMENT
Volume 35, Number 40, Bishop v. Bishop
Florida does not prohibit the verbatim adoption of a judgment that has been
proposed by a party. See M.D. v. Dept of Children & Family Servs., 924 So.2d
827, 830 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). However, the adopted judgment cannot substitute for
a thoughtful and independent analysis of the facts, issues, and law by the trial
judge. See Perlow v. Berg-Perlow, 875 So. 2d 383, 390 (Fla. 2004).

Any Final Judgments entered subsequent to first Final Judgment are termed
Supplemental Final Judgment.
Beharry v. Drake, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D61 (5^th DCA 2011)
See Perlow v. Berg-Perlow, 875 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 2010) where court held:
When [a] trial judge accepts verbatim a proposed final judgment submitted by
one party without an opportunity for comments or objections by the other party,
there is an appearance tha the trial judge did not exercise his or her
independent judgment in the case. This is especially true when the judge has
made no findings or conclusions on the record that would form the basis for the
partys proposed final judgment. This type of proceeding is fair to neither the
parties involved in a particular case nor our judicial system.
Schang v. Schang, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D279 (1^st DCA 2011)
Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.215(f) provides that [e]very judge
has a duty to rule upon and announce an order of judgment on every matter
submitted to that judge within a reasonable time.
Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2250(a)(1)(C) provides 180 days as a
presumptively reasonable period.
Excessive delay in the entry of an order warrants reversal when the delay is
combined with an indicaton that something is seriously amiss on the merits.
Ascontec Consulting, Inc. v. Young, 714 So.2d 585, 587 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998).
Purpose of the rule is to allow the trier of fact to recall the testimony and
demeanor of the witnesses as well as the dynamics of the trial. Falabella v.
Wilkins, 656 So.2d 256, 257 (Fla. 5^th DCA 1995).
FUTURE PENSION BENEFITS
35 Fla. L. Weekly D2242
933 So.2d at 14 (citing Trant v. Trant, 545 So. 2d 428, 429 (Fla. 2d DCA
1989)) Coverture Fraction Method to value.
INCOME DETERMINATION
Volume 35, Number 44, Wallace v. Wallace
Lin v. Lin, 37 So.3d 941, 943 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010)(The trial courts
determination of the amount of a partys income must be supported by competent,
substantial evidence.)
Rogers v. Rogers, 12 So.3d 288, 291-92 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)(reversing an
attorneys fee award and remanding for specific findings supporting the courts
determination of entitlement to fees, the amount of fees awarded, and any
payment plan it imposes)
McCants v. McCants, 984 So. 2d 678, 682 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)(holding that a
final judgment of dissolution that awards alimony based on a determination of
income that is not supported by competent, substantial evidence must be
reversed)
INVITED ERROR DOCTRINE
Volume 35, Number 40, Tillman v. Altunay
[U]nder the invited-error doctrine, a party may not make or invite error at
trial and then take advantage of the error on appeal. Goodwin v. State, 751
So.2d 537, 544 n.8 (Fla. 1999).
IMPUTATION OF INCOME
McCann v. McCann, 35 Fla. L. Weekly D2831 (4^th DCA
2010)
Imputation of income requires competent, substantial evidence. Guard v.
Guard, 993 So. 2d 1086, 1089 (Fla. 5^th DCA 2008).
INCARCERATED PARENT
Wilson v. Smith, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D254 (2^nd DCA 2011)
An incarcerated parents due process rights are impinged in proceedings to
change the name of a child where a hearing is requested but access to the
hearing is not provided to the incarcerated parent. See generally Gill v. Dean,
575 So.2d 311, 312 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); see also Alfonso v. Alfonso, 823 So.2d
261, 262 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)(concluding that where an incarcerated party requests
to be present and put forth evidence at a hearing on a family matter, the trial
court should afford the person such an opportunity).
INJUNCTIONS
Gill v. Gill, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D30 (2^nd DCA 2011)
Mother was not able to obtain injunction for herself where Father had
committed dv on their child. She testified that he had pushed mom a while back,
yelled at her and beaten and punched minor.
An isolated incident of domestic violence that occurred years before a
petition for injunction is filed will not usually support the issuance of an
injunction in the absence of additional current allegations. Jones v. Jones, 32
So. 3d 772, 773-74 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010)(finding that a pushing incident that
occurred three years before the injunction was filed was not sufficient to
support the issuance of an injunction against domestic violence).
However, compare Giallanza v. Giallanza, 787 So. 2d 162 (Fla. 2d DCA
2001)(finding that allegations of actual violence eight to ten years before the
petition was filed were sufficient to support the issuance of the injunction
when coupled with allegations that the husband had recently been very angry and
verbally abusive . . . due to the parties impending divorce).
[G]eneralized threats to engage in unpleasant, but not violent, behavior are
not sufficient to support the issuance of a domestic violence injunction. See
Jones v. Jones, 32 So.3d 772, 773-74 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). See also Oettmeier v.
Oettmeier, 960 So. 2d 902, 903, 905 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)(holding that injunction
was not properly issued based on threats to make the petitioners life
miserable)
Moore v. Pattin, 983 So.2d 663, 664-65 (Fla. 4^th DCA 2008)(finding
evidence that the father disciplined his daughter by hitting her with a belt and
a shoe was sufficient to support the issuance of an injunction for protection
against domestic violence in favor daughter . . . .)
Randolph v. Rich, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D362 (1^st DCA 2011)
Respondent attempted to snatch paper from Petitioner. Testimony indicating he
touched the paper. No evidence he physically touched her. Voicemail stating get
her and devote all his time to getting her
[P]etitioner[s] [do] not have to wait for abuse to occur to seek an
Injunction under section 741.30, Florida Statutes, see Gustafson v. Mauck, 743
So. 2d 614, 616 (Fla. 1^st DCA 1999).
[T]he law requires more than general relationship problems and uncivil
behavior to support the issuance of an injunction. See also Oettmeir v.
Oettmeier, 960 So.2d 902, 904 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)(reversing domestic violence
injunction where evidence merely painted . . . a typical, albeit unfortunate,
picture of a domestic relationship gone awry).
JURISDICTION
Trial court could order sale of foreign real property where parties made such
part of litigation, and equity require[s] it. Gil v. Mendelson, 870 So. 2d 825,
826 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003); see also Hoskin v. Hoskin, 349 So.2d 755 (Fla. 3d DCA
1977)(courts retain jurisdiction to enforce executor provisions, like those in
this case, contained in a final judgment of dissolution of marriage).
Holub v. Holub, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D332 (1^st DCA 2011)
Subject matter jurisdiction may be challenged for the first time on appeal.
See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(h)(2)(The defense of lack of subject matter
jurisdiction may be raised at any time.); In re D.N.H.W., 955 So.2d 1236 (Fla.
2d DCA 2007); Stromen v. Stromen, 927 So.2d 176 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)(trial courts
lack of subject matter jurisdiction renders its judgments void).
UCCJA jurisdiction is determined considering [W]here the child lived with a
parent for the six months preceding the filing of the petition, or 2) whether
the child lived in any state other than the state in which the petition was
filed for six consecutive months prior to the filing of the petition.
Volume 35, Number 42, Mikulec v. Mikulec
Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred upon a court by a constitution or
statute, and cannot be created by waiver, acquiescence or agreement of the
parties. Snider v. Snider, 686 So. 2d 802, 804 (Fla. 4^th DCA 1997);
see also Walker v. Garrison, 610 So. 2d 716, 718 (Fla. 4^th DCA
1992)(estoppels cannot defeat a challenge to lack of subject matter
jurisdiction; [n]either conduct nor consent of the parties may confer on a court
subject matter jurisdiction which it does not otherwise have).
61.021, Florida Statutes, provides that one of the parties to the marriage
must reside 6 months in the state before the filing of the petition. See
Fernandez v. Fernandez, 648 So.2d 712, 713 (Fla. 1995)(recognizing Floridas
residency requirement is jurisdictional and must be alleged and proved in every
case . . . .corroborating testimony cannot be waived by an admission that the
residency requirement has been met); Cleveland v. Cleveland, 692 So.2d 304, 305
(Fla. 4^th DCA 1997).
INCOME
Berges v. Berges, 871 So. 2d 919, 922 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004)(holding
that in order to arrive at the husbands business income, the trial court was
obligated to subtract his ordinary and necessary business expenses from his
gross receipts).

INJUNCTIONS

Fleshman v. Fleshman, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D113 (2^nd DCA 2011)

Error to enter injunction preventing father from having contact with son
where they have never resided together under 741.28(3),.30, Fla. Stat. (2009).
Statute reads the family or household members must be residing or have in the
past resided together in the same single dwelling unit.

LIFE INSURANCE

Beharry v. Drake, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D61 (5^th DCA 2011)
Section 61.13(1)(c) Florida Statutes (2007) authorizes trial courts to order
a parent to carry life insurance policy:
(c) To the extent necessary to protect an award of child support, the court
may order the obligor to purchase or maintain a life insurance policy or a bond,
or to otherwise secure the child support award with any other assets which may
be suitable for that purpose.

[T]he amount of life insurance required by the trial court must be related to
the extent of the obligation secured. See Kotlarz v. Kotlarz, 21 So. 3d 892, 893
(Fla. 1^st DCA 2009)(citing Burnham v. Burnham, 884 So 2d 390, 392
(Fla. 2d DCA 2004).

In the case at bar, court found $100,000.00 policy too much to secure
$73,000.00 in child support payments.

Since the fathers total child support obligation decreases over time, the
amount of the life insurance required should correspondingly decrease over time.
Id.

The courts are statutorily authorized to order the obligor to maintain life
insurance to protect alimony awards and child support obligations . . .when
appropriate circumstances exist to justify the award. Appropriate circumstances
may include the dire impact that the sudden death of the obligated party would
have on the receiving party. In ordering this protection, the court should
consider the availability and cost of such insurance and the financial impact it
will have on the former husband. See Rashid v. Rashid, 35 So. 3d 992, 994 (Fla.
5^th DCA 2010).

See also 61.08(3).
See Peters v. Blackshear, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D357 (1^st DCA
2011)

MARITAL SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

Ferguson v. Ferguson, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D229 (3^rd DCA 2011)

Husband had agreed to pay 185k to wife but market turned. Tried to get out of
agreement via impossibility of performance, etc.

bad deals are as enforceable in the law as good deals . . . .

A marital settlement agreement entered into by the parties and raitified by a
final judgment is a contract, subject to the laws of contract. See Anderson
Windows, Inc. v. Hochberg, 997 So.2d 1212, 1213 9Fla. 3d DCA 2008); Delissio v.
Delissio, 821 So.2d 350, 353 (Fla. 1^st DCA 2002).

Because of the central importance placed upon the enforceability of contracs
in our culture, the defense of impossibility (and its cousins, impracticability
and frustration of purpose) must therefore be applied with great caution if the
contingency was forseeable at the inception of the agreement. See Hom Design
Ctr.-Joint Venture v. Cnty. Appliances of Naples, Inc., 563 So.2d 767, 769070
(Fla. 2d DCA 1990).

Economic downturns and other market shifts do not truly constitute
unanticipated circumstances in a market-based economy.

A trial court is not authorized to intervene to ameliorate a hardship that a
promisor, . . . could have thus avoided. See McCutcheon v. Tracy, 928 So.2d 364,
364 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)([A] court may not deviate from the terms of a voluntary
contract either to achieve what it might think is a more appropriate result or
to relieve the parties from the apparent hardship of an improvident
bargain.(quoting Beach Resort Hotel Corp. v. Wieder, 79 So.2d 659, 663 (Fla.
1955)).

Morrison v. Morrison, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D321 (2^nd DCA 2011)

Florida courts respect agreements made by parties to a dissolution [w]hen
such agreements are fairly entered into and are not tainted by fraud,
overreaching or concealment . . . . Griffith v. Griffith, 860 So.2d 1069, 1072
(Fla. 1^st DCA 2003)(quoting Sedell v. Seddell, 100 So. 2d 639, 642
(Fla. 1^st DCA 1958)).

MODIFICATIONS
Delate v. Iler, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D191 (4^th DCA 2011)

To justify a modificfation of alimony, the moving party must show: (1) a
substantial change in circumstances; (2) that the change was not contemplated at
the final judgment of dissolution; and (3) that the change is sufficient,
material, permanent, and invlonutary. Kusick v. Kusick, 944 So.2d 1081, 1082
(Fla. 2d DCA 2006)

See also 61.14, Florida Statutes.

Webber v. Webber, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D208

[A] retroactive child support obligation may not be imposed prior to the
filing of a petition seeking modification. See 61.14(1)(a), Fla. Stat
(2006)(providing that court may modify support order retroactively to the date
of the filing of the action or supplemental action for modification as equity
requires); Musser v. Watkins, 752 So. 2d 141, 143 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)(Absent the
filing of a petition for modification, [the amount of child support] remain[s]
fixed by [the] judgment [of dissolution] and cannot be modified prior to the
time a proper petition for modification was filed.); Torres v. Torres, 739 So.2d
599, 600 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)(It is settled that a trial court cannot modify a
child support obligation absent a pleading or motion requesting such
modification.).

Doran v. Doran, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D44 (1^st DCA 2011)
Time-Sharing schedule modification requires showing of a substantial,
material, and unanticipated change in the circumstances and a determination that
it is in the best interests of the child. Fla. Stat. 61.13(3)(2010).

Morrison v. Morrison, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D321 (2^nd DCA 2011)

In Alimony modification proceedings, Petitioner must show a substantial
change in circumstances that was not contemplated at the time of the final
judgment and that is sufficient, material, permanent, and involuntary. Chambliss
v. Chambliss, 921 So.2d 822, 824 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)(citing Yangco v. Yangco, 901
So.2d 217, 219 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)).

If the alimony award is fixed by agreement, the party seeking to modify that
award carries an exceptionally heavy burdern. Id. (citing Johnson v. Johnson,
386 So.2d 14, 16 (Fla. 5^th DCA 1980)); see also Pimm v. Pimm, 601
So.2d 534, 537 (Fla. 1992).

See Section 61.14(1)(a).

Substantial change means a substantial change in one spouses needs, or (2) a
substantial increase in the paying spouses ability to pay. See Eiseman v.
Eisemann, 5 So. 3d 760 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009).

There is a Bedell exception though. Bedell v. Bedell, 583 So.2d 1005 (Fla.
1991) which applies in
The relatively rare case where the recipient spouses needs, as established by
the standard of living maintained during the marriage, were not, and could not
be initially met by the original final judgment of marriage dissolution due to
the then-existing financial inability of the paying spouse to meet those needs,
which needs continue to remain unmet at the time of modification.

For Bedell to apply, the recipient spouse must show that in the original
judgment of dissolution, the trial court was legally required to award an amount
of alimony that did not meet the needs of the recipient spouse, based on the
marital standard of living, because the paying spouse was financially unable to
meet those needs.Eisemann, 5 So. 3d at 764.

See Bedell, 583 So.2d 1007 (finding that a substantial increase in the
financial ability of the paying spouse, standing alone, may justify but does not
require an order of increased alimony [and[ the final decision rests with the
circuit court.

The court here abused discretion by increasing alimony where payors income
increases temporarily from trust payments which were not permanent in
nature.

[A] temporary change in circumstances cannot justify a permanent modification
of alimony.

Spano v. Bruce, 36 Fla. L. Weeklt D399 3^rd DCA 2011)

This case champions allowing retroactive back to original petition even if a
supplementary petition was later filed due to non-service of first.

The trial courts authority to order a reduction in a child support obligation
retroactive to the date on which a petition for modification is filed is clear.
See Miles v. Champlin, 805 So. 2d 1085, 1086 (Fla. 1^st DCA 2002)([A]
trial court may modify an order of support . . . by increasing or decreasing the
support . . . retroactively to the date of the filing of the action or
supplemental action for modification as equity requires)(citation omitted).
Moreover, child support modifications should be made retroactive to the time
when the petition for modification was filed. See also Batts v Batts, 600 So.2d
1301 (Fla. 5^th DCA 1992).

Where the circumstances that give rise to a modification of child support
exist at the time during which a petition for modification is filed, failure to
order the modification retroactive to the date of the filing of the petition
constitutes an abuse of discretion. See also Levi v. Levi, 780 So. 2d 261, 263
(Fla. 3d DCA 2001).

Volume 35, Number 42, D2249, Smith v. Smith
a parents subsequent failure to actually exercise the amount of overnight
visitation that has been ordered is ground for retroactively modifying the
adjusted support. 61.30(11)(c); Keeley v. Keeley, 899 So. 2d 387 (Fla. 2d DCA
2005). But the statute also contemplates that a partys entitlement to the
adjustment is not absolute.
61.30(11)(b) plainly states that the court may deviate from an adjusted child
support award in light of the likelihood that either parent will actually
exercise the time-sharing schedule set forth in the parenting plan granted by
the court.
Hill v. Calderin (3^rd DCA)
Where an order determining child support exists, a trial court may not
increase the amount of child support, except upon a petition for modification.
Torres v. Torres, 739 So.2d 599 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997).
Volume 35, Number 43, Moforis v. Constanzo
Facts: trial court stated husband made 100k on modification but did not
include findings as to how it arrived at that number. Reversed.
Jones v. Jones, 636 So. 2d 867, 867 (Fla. 4^th DCA 1994)(reversing
and remanding for trial court to make specific findings as to the parties
income, basis for modification, and justification for departure); Cifrian v.
Crfrian, 715 So. 2d 1068, 1070-71 (Fla. 4^th DCA 1998)(reversing child
support award because of the trial courts failure to recite a basis for its
determination of the parties incomes).
Volume 35, Number 44, Sidman v. Marino
Sections 61.13(2)(c) and (3), Florida Statutes, require proof that
modification of a parenting plan and time-sharing schedule is in the best
interests of the child and is based upon a substantial, material, and
unanticipated change in circumstances. See Kelly v. Colston, 977 So.2d 692 (Fla.
1^st DCA 2008).
Although evidence may have shown increasing time-sharing with Father was in
best interest, there was no evidence of an unanticipated and substantial change
in circumstances.
Here, there was an additional weekly overnight that the mother had agreed to
informally.
[A]llowing an agreement between the parents to provide a basis for
modification would discourage parents from making informal, joint decisions for
the benefit of the their children. See, e.g., Smoak v. Smoak, 658 So. 2d 568
(Fla. 1^st DCA 1995).
MOTION FOR REHEARING
Volume 35, Number 43, Colon v. Colon
Motion for rehearing must be filed within (10) days.
NON MARITAL ASSETS
Volume 35, Number 42, Van Den Berg v. Van Den Berg (5^th DCA)
Section 61.075(5)(b)1., Florida Statutes (2007), defines a nonmarital asset
as one acquired by either party prior to the marriage.
Non-marital assets lose their character if the asset itself becomes comingled
and untraceable. Archer v. Archer, 712 So.2d 1198 9Fla. 5^th DCA
1998); see also Belmont v. Belmont, 761 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).
ORDERS/OBJECTING TO
Justice Administrative Commission v. Taylor, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D26
(1^st DCA 2010)
It is error for a trial court to adopt verbatim a proposed final judgment
without giving the opposing party an opportunity to comment. See Perlow v.
Berg-Perlow, 875 So. 2d 383, 389-90 (Fla. 2004).
Plitcha v. Plitcha, 899 So. 2d 1283, 1285-86 (Fla. 2d DCA
2005)(holding that Perlow does not require a trial court to afford a litigant
the opportunity to object to a proposed order prior to the courts adoption of it
if the proposed order merely memorializes rulings the trial court has already
made).
PATERNITY
Nevitt v. Bonomo, 35 Fla. L. Weekly D2871 (1^st DCA
2010)

A child born or conceived during marriage is legitimate, and a person seeking
to challenge the childs paternity must overcome the strong, albeit rebuttable,
presumption of legitimacy. See In re Adoption of Baby James Doe, 572 So. 2d 986,
988 (Fla. 1^st DCA 1990); see also Smith v. Wise, 234 So. 2d 145, 146
(Fla. 3d DCA 1970)(A child conceived in wedlock, but born after termination of
the marriage is legitimate.). The presumption is so strong that it can defeat
the claim of a man proven beyond all doubt to be the biological father. Dept of
Health & Rehabilitative Servs. V. Privette, 617 So. 2d 305, 308 (Fla. 1993);
see also Dept of Revenue v. Cummings, 930 So. 2d 604, 607 (Fla. 2006)(The
presumption of legitimacy is one of the strongest rebuttable presumptions known
to law.
Biological father must show that he has manifested a substantial concern for
the welfare of [the] child. Kendrick v. Everheart, 390 So. 2d 53, 60 (Fla.
1980).
Putative biological father has no right to seek to establish paternity of a
child who was born into an intact marriage when the married woman and her
husband object. Johnson v. Ruby, 771 So.2d 1275, 1275-76 (Fla. 4^th
DCA 2000); see also Tijerno v. Estrella, 843 So. 2d 984 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000).
Intact marriage is defined as the existence of a marriage without the
pendency of divorce proceedings. Lander v. Smith, 906 So. 2d 1130, 1134 (Fla.
4^th DCA 2005).
PETITION FOR DOMESTICATION
Sullivan v. Hoff-Sullivan, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D354 (1^st DCA
2011)
Florida trial courts have jurisdiction to modify child support from the date
[a] petition for domestication [is] filed. See Barr v. Barr, 724 So.2d 1200,
1202 (Fla. 1^st DCA 1998).
PLEADINGS
Holub v. Holub, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D332 (1^st DCA 2011)
[P]arties are bound by their pleadings-admissions in pleadings need not be
proven further. City of Deland v. Miller, 608 So. 2d 121 )Fla. 5^th
DCA 1992); Carnell v. Kinsey, 87 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 1956).
Florida Rules of Civil procedure 1.110(e) states in pertinent part
[a]verments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is required . . . are
admitted when not denied in the responsive pleading. See also Fla. Fam.L.R.P.
12.110.
Look at 61.514 & 61.503(7)
See also Hindle v. Fuith, 33 So. 3d 782 (Fla. 5^th DCA 2010)(child
resided in several states during six months prior to commencement of the action,
no court of any other state would have had jurisdiction as home state; Florida
trial court had jurisdiction to make initial custody determination).
61.514(1) A period of temporary absence of any of the mentioned persons is
part of the period.
It seems that the child need not physically be in the state for 6 months in
order to count the 6 months.
RELOCATION
Crombie v. Williams, 35 Fla. L. Weekly D2893 (3^rd DCA 2010)
61.13(2)(d), Fla. Stat. (2006)(concluding in part, No presumption shall arise
in favor of or against a request to relocate when a primary residential parent
seeks to move the child and the move will materially affect the current schedule
of contact and access with the secondary residential parent).
Arthur v. Arthur, 36 Fla. L. Weekly S78 (FL. 2011)
Section 61.13001, Florida Statutes (2006) establishes procedure for
relocation.
11 factors to evaluate
A best interests determination in petitions for relocation must be made at
the time of the final hearing and must be supported by competent, substantial
evidence.
Trial court may not decide that 20 Months after the final hearing, the
relocation will occur.
[T]rial court is not equipped with a crystal ball that enables it to
prophetically determine whether future relocation is in the best interest of a
child.
Because trial courts are unable to predict whether a change in statutory
factors will occur, the proper review of a petition for relocation entails a
best interests determination at the time of the final hearing, i.e. a
present-based analysis.
RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT
Volume 35, Number 43, Colon v. Colon
Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.540(4)(On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court
may relieve a party or a partys legal representative from a final judgment,
decree, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: . . . (4) that the
judgment or decree is void; . . . . The motion shall be filed within a
reasonable time.).
M.L. Builders, Inc., v. Reserve Developers, LLP, 769 So. 2d 1079, 1082 (Fla.
4^th DCA 2002)(While it is true that Rule 1.540(b)(4) states that a
motion for relief from a judgment must be made within a reasonable time, most
courts have felt constrained to interpret the reasonable time requirement of the
rule to mean no time limit when the judgment attacked is void: Assuming that a
judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction does a Rule 1.540(b) motion
for relief not brought within a reasonable time have the effect of making a void
judgment valid? The answer is no. (quoting Whigham v. Whigham, 464 So. 2d 674,
676 (Fla. 5^th DCA 1985))).
In the case at bar, Husband filed Motion for Relief from Judgment arguing the
judgment was void because the court failed to provide him notice of mediation
and notice of the final hearing. This resulted in a denial of due process.
RES JUDICATA
Sullivan v. Hoff-Sullivan, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D354 (1^st DCA
2011)
The foundation of res judicata is that a final judgment in a court of
competent jurisdiction is absolute and settles all issues actually litigated in
a proceeding as well as those issues that could have been litigated. Engle v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So.2d 1246, 1259 (Fla. 2006); see Fla. Dept of Transp.
V. Juliano, 801 So.2d 101 (Fla. 2001).
RETROACTIVE SUPPORT
Swor v. Swor, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D208 (2^nd DCA 2011)
61.30(17)(a) requires the court to consider the obligors demonstration of his
or her actual income . . during the retroactive period when determining the
amount of a retroactive child support award).
Trial court had included Alimony payments into calculation where there were a
few months obligor did not receive same.
SANCTIONS
Arki v. United Glass Corp., 36 Fla. L. Weekly D186 (3^rd DCA
2011)
Because dismissal is the ultimate sanction in the adversarial system, it
should be reserved for those aggravating circumstances in which a lesser
sanction would fail to achieve a just result. Kozel v. Ostendorf, 629 So. 2d
817, 818 (Fla. 1993). To ensure that the sanction of dismissal is prudently
applied, trial courts must first make certain preliminary findings of fact.
Alvarado v. Snow White & the Seven Dwarfs, Inc., 8 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 3d DCA
2009); Tianvan v. AVCO Corp., 898 So.2d 1208, 1209 (Fla. 4^th DCA
2005). These findings must address:
1) Whether the attorneys disobedience was willful, deliberate, or
contumacios, rather than an act of neglect or inexperience; 2) whether th
attorney has been previously sactioned; 3) whether the client was personally
involved in the act of disobedience; 4) whether the delay prejudiced the
opposing party through undue expense, loss of evidence, or in some other
fashion; 5) whether the attorney offered reasonable justification for
noncompliance; and 6) whether the delay created significant problems of judicial
administration. Kozel, 629 So.2d at 818.
See Cook v. Custom Marine Distributing, Inc., 29 So. 3d 462 (Fla.
4^th DCA 2010).
SERVICE OF PROCESS
Kwong v. Kwong, 35 Fla. L. Weekly D2831 (4^th DCA 2010)
Process server failed to note time of service.
Strict compliance with statutory requirements of service is mandated . . .
See Vidal v. Suntrust Bank, 41 So. 3d 401 (Fla. 4^th DCA 2010).
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS
Schlifstein v. Schlifstein, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D291 (2^nd DCA
2011)
Court erred in entering final judgment based on void mediation agreement.
The agreement was titled conditional full settlement and read this agreement
shall be a nullity and have no force and effect whatsoever unless Husband paid
$130,000.00 to wife which sum is to be paid from a refinancing.
SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY & VETERAN
BENEFITS
Maslow v. Edwards, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D266 (5^th DCA 2011)
See Wallace v. Dept. of Revenue ex rel. Cutter, 774 So.2d 804 (Fla. 2d DCA
2000), the court explained:
[W]hen a parent is receiving social security disability due to the disability
and, as a result, his or her children receive independent benefits, the total
benefits received by or on behalf of that parent are attributed to the disabled
parent as income in the child support guideline calculation. The dependent
benefits are then credited toward the disabled parents obligation, that is, they
are a payment of the obligation on behalf of the disabled parent. If the
benefits are less than the support obligation, the disabled parent must pay the
difference. If they are more, the benefits pay the obligation in full, but any
excess inures to the benefit of the children.
There is no reason to treat disability benefits paid by Veterans
Administration any different than those paid by Social Security.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Volume 35, Number 42, D2249 Smith v. Smith
Summary judgment is permitted only when the moving party has demonstrated
that there are no disputed issues of material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Holl v. Talcott, 191 So.2d 40 (Fla.
1966)
TIME SHARING
Winters v. Brown, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D175 (4^th DCA 2011)
Florida Statute 61.13(3).
While a trial court need not address each of these factors independently, a
trial court must make a finding that the time-sharing schedule is in the childs
best interests. Kelly v. Colston, 32 So. 3d 186, 187 (Fla. 1^st DCA
2010).
The requisite findings must either be stated on the record or set out in the
order. Clark v. Clark, 825 So.2d 1016, 1017 (Fla. 1^st DCA 2002).

MOTION TO DISMISS
Nevitt v. Bonomo, 35 Fla. L. Weekly D 2871 (1^st DCA 2010)
For purposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss, the trial court may look n
further than the four corners of the complaint, an all allegations in the
complaint must be accepted as true. See also Roos v. Morrison, 913 So. 2d 59, 62
(Fla. 1^st DCA 2005).
VACCINATIONS/MEDICAL
Winters v.Brown, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D175 (4^th DCA 2011)
Florida Statutes 1003.22(5)(a), allows parent to obtain exemption from the
immunization requirement to attend public school.
While courts have consistently overturned restrictions on exposing a child to
a parents religious beliefs and practices, they make an exception where there is
a clear, affirmative showing that these religious activities will be harmful to
the child. Mesa v. Mesa, 652 So.2d 456, 457 (Fla. 4^th DCA 1995).
Court awarded ultimate decision making ability regarding medical issues to
parent requesting vaccinations.